Pakistan 1971 War: Why Yahya Regime Delayed Countering India’s All-Out War in East Pakistan

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By Tariq Majeed : –
A Nation endangers its survival if it fails to comprehend that the; Enemy is having his Aims fulfilled through the Nation’s top Leaders.

Background
1. Indian forces crossing the border launched a full scale invasion in East Pakistan on Night 20/21 November 1971, attacking simultaneously as many as 23 salients along the border. The Yahya regime, strangely, did not immediately launch the Counter-Offensive as required by the set Defence Policy that ‘Defence of East Pakistan lay in the West.’ It also did not immediately inform the people of Pakistan and the UN Security Council that India had launched an All-Out War against Pakistan.

2. Then, 13 days later, on 3 December, when Indian forces had made substantial gains in East Pakistan, General Yahya abruptly, and irresolutely, opened the war front in West Pakistan.

3. Thereafter, on losing the battles at both Fronts and being unprepared for all-out war and lacking in combat skill and courage, General Yahya and his coterie of Generals in Islamabad and Lt. General Niazi in East Pakistan fell into a state of paralysis. Their will collapsed and they conceded surrender on December 16. India, having achieved its designed Political Aim, immediately offered a unilateral ceasefire, which was accepted by Yahya regime on Dec. 17, and the War ended.

4. We hear every now and then people saying, ‘We have not learnt any lesson from the 1971 disaster,’ but no concrete examples are cited. Most of such people, in fact, do not know the real lessons to be learnt, mainly because no in-depth study of the 1971 political crisis and war is available in the public domain. Besides, this topic is shunned by the media and the military authorities. Actually, vital lessons of national concern come out from an in-depth study of various aspects of just the War. For example, one aspect is the deplorable behavior of the then top leaders and their wrong decisions. Another is the treachery committed, on the one hand by some of the top military and civil leaders including Z. A. Bhutto, and on the other by the US government.

Objective of this Paper

5. This paper investigates Yahya regime’s inaction for 13 days before countering India’s launching of all-out war in East Pakistan. This vitally important question, unfortunately, has not been addressed by many of the serious writers, including senior military officers who have written about the 1971 War in their books, quoted here. The fact is, this one event holds very important lessons concerning our national security. People generally, but the civil and military policymakers particularly, must grasp these lessons, so as to understand the real nature of the current dangers, especially the deadly terrorism, and to realize that there are serious flaws in the policies meant to deal with the dangers.

The Pakistan Army–1966 – 1971

6. Maj. Gen. Shaukat Riza, kind of Pakistan Army’s official historian, in the chapter, The War in the West, merely narrates tactical deployment and operations of various units. At the outset, he describes superficially the political/strategic situation. His book is most disappointing concerning the issue we are investigating. He writes (p.165/166):

“Indian forces had invaded East Pakistan on 21 November 1971, on the pretext of protecting Indian borders against ‘frequent violations by Pakistani troops.’… After 21 Nov, Pakistan tried through UN for a political settlement of the dispute…By 2 December it was apparent that Indian Army was in a position to over-run East Pakistan during the ensuing two weeks…At 1800 hours 3 December, Pakistan Air Force attacked nine Indian air bases. At the same time General Yahya broadcast to the nation about war against India.”

Shaukat Riza is totally oblivious to the 13-days delay.

History of the Pakistan Army–Wars and Insurrections

7. Brian Cloughley discusses the tactical operations and battles of the War. His narrative does not single out the attacks on 21 November as the launching of general war by India. He ignores the question of the13-days delay, and only has this to say (p.222):

“The Indian invasion of East Pakistan had been planned for many months and was preceded by considerable cross-border activity in November. It was legitimized by Pakistan’s barely credible decision to attack India from the west on 3 December.”

An Army–Its Role and Rule

8. Muhammad Ayub served briefly in the education department of the government in 1984. The title of the book is a bit misleading; actually it is about Pakistan Army. The author writes (p.214):

“From November 21 to November 25, several Indian Army Divisions, divided into smaller tactical units, launched simultaneous military actions on all of the key border regions of East Pakistan and from all directions.Islamabad didn’t bother to inform the nation as to what was really happening in East Pakistan… In fact a full-fledged war had been going on since November 21.”

He criticizes the delayed and irresolute decision to declare war on India on 3 December, and asks the authorities to answer: ‘Why Pakistan waited for two weeks to respond to the Indian attack on East Pakistan.’

How Pakistan Got Divided

9. Major General Rao Farman Ali Khan was in East Pakistan from Feb 1967 till the end of the 1971 War, first as Commander Artillery 14 Division then as In Charge of Civil Affairs at the Martial Law Headquarter in Dacca. His book does not mention even the Nov 20/21 attack by the Indian forces in East Pakistan; neither does he say anything about the 13-days delay.

Witness to Surrender

10. Siddiq Salik was in Dacca since early 1969 till its fall, serving as Eastern Command’s Public Relations Officer. He writes (p.119/120):

“In public we termed the 21 November battle as an enemy attack supported with MIGs, armour and artillery. In fact, it was an attempt on our part to throw back the enemy who had occupied the area since 13 November.

Then in the same breath he says, “During the same week (20-25 Nov), India attacked Zakiganj and Atgram in Sylhet area, Hilli in Dinajpur and Pachagarh in Rangpur district.” He declines to accept that these coordinated forceful attacks into East Pakistan territory meant India had launched all-out war. He totally ignores the issue of 13-days delay.

Story of the Pakistan Navy

11. Serving as the Navy’s history, the book says (p.333/334):

“On the night of 20/21 November, Indian forces estimated at about 100,000 in strength, supported by tanks, advanced into East Pakistan at several salients.

Government of Pakistan issued a proclamation of state of emergency….A plan for a counter-offensive in the West was presented to the President of Pakistan on 30 November 1971 and the high command decided to initiate military operations in the West on 3 December 1971.”

It does not even raise the question of 13-days delay.

Truth Never Retires

12. Admiral Sirohey (Retd), who was commanding a ship under refit at Karachi during the war, alludes to “Invasion of East Pakistan by India on 20/21 November (p.189),”… and says, “The war in East Pakistan had started….Pakistan started hostilities against India in West Pakistan on 3rd December 1971.”

He says not a word about the 13-days delay. This is disappointing, because later in his career he served as Chief of Naval Staff and then as Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, before writing the book.

Admiral’s Diary

13. Admiral Shariff was in Dacca as Flag Officer Commanding East Pakistan (FOCEP) since 9 June 1971 till the surrender. His book only briefly mentions about India launching all-out war on 20 November and about Pakistan opening the front in the West:

“The discouraging news about the lack of success in the western wing had demoralizing effect at all levels. ‘The defence of East Pakistan lies in the West’ was belied (p.109).”

There is no mention of the 13-days delay, which is surprising, because he was at the War front and should have been keen to know why the Counter-Offensive was delayed. Besides, after his return to Pakistan, he rejoined the Navy and became Chief of Naval Staff in 1976, and had access to records of top policies.

The Story of the Pakistan Air Force

14. This book gives some meaningful remarks on the subject that we are exploring. It records (p. 446):

“Indians launched their full-scale invasion at four points across East Pakistan’s border, on Eid day 21 November 1971….The widely understood concept of Pakistan’s military strategy was that, if India chose to attack East Pakistan first, there would be an immediate response from Pakistani forces in the West. This doctrine had been so deeply ingrained in the minds of Pakistan’s General Staff that it would have been inconceivable to imagine anything less than instant retaliation to such an Indian move.

“The events which followed the Indian attack on East Pakistan showed that the commander of Pak forces, General A. A. K. Niazi persisted in a faulty concept of Border Defence, against advice from many quarters. In the West, the President and the Army Chief of Staff fell into a paralytic state of indecision concerning the Counter Offensive for which they had prepared the Army and the PAF for over a year.

“Thus the military as well as the moral foundation of Pakistan’s defence strategy was demolished in the two wings by its own architects. As November gave way to December, the bewilderment of the soldier, sailor and airman in the field turned into raging frustration.”

The book does not inquire further into the question of delay.

The 1971 Indo-Pak War

15. Maj. Gen. Hakeem Arshad Qureshi commanded 26 FF Regiment in East Pakistan during the War. His brief comment on the delay in the Counter-Offensive is quite pertinent (p.137/138):

“Indian aggression escalated throughout 1971. Their onslaught on East Pakistan … reached the level of a fully-fledged offensive from all sides by mid-November. The declaration of war on 3 December was therefore rather strange. Why the delayed reaction and why this particular date? Our main offensive [in West Pakistan], though, the linchpin of the defensive plan, never took off. Some say this was because of indecision on the part of the leadership, others that it was a deliberate inaction to allow the capitulation of Dhaka…”

The Betrayal of East Pakistan

16. Lt. Gen. Niazi was Commander Eastern Command in Dacca since April 1971 till he surrendered to the Enemy. He writes (p.118):

“On the night of 20/21 November 1971, Indian Army attacked East Pakistan from all directions…They [Pakistan Government] did not tell the people in so many words that a full-fledged war had been going on in East Pakistan since 21 November 1971.

General Yahya had said that an attack on any portion of Pakistan would invoke retaliation, but for the benefit of the Indians, and on the advice of Bhutto, he did not retaliate immediately when the Indian Army attacked on 21 November….

“My Chief of Staff (Brig Baqir Siddiqui), who was at GHQ, was told by the CGS to rush back to Dacca as Indian invasion was expected on Eid Day (p.119). On 21 Nov, my Chief of Staff rang up the Vice Chief of General Staff at GHQ, Major General Qureshi, and followed with a written signal about the Indian invasion. I tried to speak to the Chief of General Staff, Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan, but he had gone to Lahore to celebrate Eid knowing full well that the Indians were going to attack East Pakistan on 21 Nov.

“I tried to contact Gen. Hamid, COAS. He too was not available. I learnt later that both he and President had left for Sialkot, ostensibly to visit troops but actually for a partridge shoot. The callous attitude of the three senior most officers of the Army shows that they were not in the least interested in the affairs of East Pakistan or the

integrity of Pakistan. This did not upset me because I had guessed their intentions and had an inkling through my COS that they had decided to quit East Pakistan and abandon us” (p.123).

Memoirs of Lt. Gen Gul Hassan Khan

17. What is Gul Hassan’s story on this issue? He writes (p.319):

“In November, information received from Eastern Command and other sources confirmed that the Indians had amassed 8 to 10 divisions around East Pakistan…I asked the DMI whether the COS, [Gen. Hamid], was aware of these developments, and he answered in the affirmative. Reluctantly, I made my way to the C-in-C’s Secretariat on 16 November. Having heard my piece he replied, not for the first time, that he and Gen. Niazi were both fully in the picture and hence there was no need to issue any further instructions…

“A couple of days later, the COS told me to send a signal to Eastern Command, warning it to be on its toes because information had been received that the Indians were likely to attack East Pakistan on Eid day which fell on 20 November (p.320). When I asked him where he had obtained the information from, he answered that the source was reliable.

“The signal was dispatched, after which the DMO and the DMI came to my office and once again told me that, in view of the gravity of the moment, I should urge the COS to order Eastern Command to discard the political objective given to it by HQ CMLA and redeploy to meet the impending Indian aggression. I had another session with the COS. The result was no different from my previous missions.

“My patience had long run out… I called the COS with a request that I should be allowed to go to Lahore for a day: he was delighted…and told me to have a good time. On my return from Lahore on 21 November, the DMI informed me that the Indians had attacked several places on the border in East Pakistan.

I called the COS and conveyed to him what I had gathered from the DMI and told him that I would arrange a meeting in the Operations Room and that he should request the President to attend as this development was grave and needed critical examination and decisions would have to be taken on what our reaction should be.

“But I was told that the President and he were scheduled to visit Sialkot the next day, 22 November. I answered that there was nothing of importance happening at Sialkot, whereas the situation in the East had exploded in our face and that it was vital that the President be briefed so that we could obtain some urgent decisions from him. However, my entreaties were of no avail; he simply said that the boys in Sialkot would be most disappointed if the trip was called off (p.32 1).

“On 22 November, in the afternoon, [the Air Chief and I] met the President when his aircraft landed. I went straight up to him and told him that events in East Pakistan had reached the danger level and that he must come to GHQ as some vital decisions had to be taken… We all drove to GHQ where he was brought up to date. He gave no

decisions but told us to meet him at his residence at 6 p.m. as by then he would have had time to think over the problem.

“The assembly [at his residence] included some civil servants, COS and Air Chief. The President addressed me, asking what should be done to deal with the situation. I replied that this as well as previous governments had directed GHQ that, in case of an attack on East Pakistan, it should plan to rescue that part by an offensive from the West. The plans for such an eventuality had been drawn up and approved by him and time was of the essence; so the sooner he gave us the green light for putting our plans into operation the better, the chances of imposing caution on the Indians now were propitious.

“The President listened to all I had to say and then remarked: ‘You must be informed that serious negotiations are in progress at this time and if we opened a front in the West, these would be jeopardized.’ He then looked at General Hamid, who nodded his assent. I did not know who was negotiating with whom… The President then instructed a representative of the Foreign Office to send a message to our permanent representative at the UN that India had aggressed against East Pakistan and that this should be brought to the notice of the Secretary General. The meeting then broke up without any meaningful decisions” (p.322).

Unlikely Beginnings–A Soldier’s Life

18. Major General Mitha was Chief of Logistics in GHQ in 1971. He talks of various matters concerning the 1971 War, but does not clearly mention the Indian invasion of 20/21 Nov, nor does he raise the question of the 13-days delay. Some of his statements are of interest (p. 349/350):

“I still do not understand why intelligent people like Yahya and Hamid believed that India would not attack…In early August 1971, the ISI gave a briefing on the positioning of the Indian Army. This made everybody sit up because it was obvious India was gradually deploying army on our borders in East and West Pakistan. However, the belief that India would not attack persisted even after the attack on Kamalpur on 30 October 1971.

[In early 1993], I met my friend, Sajjad Hyder, who was [during the War] our High Commissioner in India. He told me that in July 1971, he had sent the Government a copy of the orders issued by General Sam Maneckshaw, C-in-C Indian Army, to his formations to prepare to attack East Pakistan, the date for doing so, and the number of days in which East Pakistan was to be occupied. According to Sajjad there was no reaction, so in September 1971, when he had come to Pakistan, he went to see Gul Hassan, who had been in the same Company as Sajjad in the Indian Military Academy. Gul apparently said, ‘What is this nonsense you keep sending to the Foreign Office,’ referring to the above-mentioned letter. Sajjad told Gul the letter was genuine, but Gul kept on ridiculing it. Sajjad said, to this day he has not understood why GHQ refused to accept what was a fact. Mitha says this incident is mentioned in Sajjad Hyder’s book Reflections of an Ambassador.

On 30 November, Yahya held a conference in GHQ, which the COS, Air C-in-C, CGS and I attended (p.353). Yahya told us he had bent over backwards to meet all of India’s demands on the so-called refugee problem, but India refused to accept any of our proposals and wanted war. He had also hoped that pressure from the UN, US, and Russia would stop India from committing aggression. However, India had not listened to anyone and attacked East Pakistan. He said he had consulted various politicians and they had all agreed that war was inevitable. However, he would have one more try to persuade India to stop her aggression against East Pakistan and settle whatever problems she had peacefully. If he failed, then we would go to war on 1 Dec 1971. This date was later changed to 3 December, for reasons I do not know.”

Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report

19. In Chapter 46 (p. 431), the Report says: “As we have endeavored to show in the preceding chapter, the Indians did not wait for any excuse. They had already started an all-out war on 20th November 1971.”

Under the heading, ‘Events in East Pakistan from 20th November to 3rd December 1971,’ the Report describes the Indian forces advancing into East Pakistan, and capturing military posts and towns. It says (p.441), “The threat to Dacca materialized from 3rd and 4th December 1971.”

Page 204 of the Report describes the Counter-Offensive issue:

“On the basis of the previous prevailing assumption that the defence of the East lay in the West, an army offensive plan had in fact been evolved in August-September 1971. It was appreciated that in the event of an Indian offensive against East Pakistan there will be no option left but to launch a counter-offensive from the West with the aim of capturing as much sensitive Indian territory as possible. This GHQ directive was known as directive No. 7/71 and its whole purpose was to counteract the Indians upon their intervention in East Pakistan which was apprehended and on reliable information was expected to be launched by 20th November 1971…

“The evidence that has come before us is to the effect that even after the attack had been launched by India nothing was done except for declaring an emergency on 23rd November 1971. This had no material bearing on the military operations at all. Actually, the commander-in-chief and the president had not even bothered to visit the military operations room upto that date nor did he appear to be at all perturbed with the seriousness of the situation developing in East Pakistan…The decision to open the second front was actually taken on 29th but even then it was a tentative decision, for the actual D-Day had yet to be fixed…The final decision that it would be 3rd December was not known until 30th November 1971.”

The Commission left this vitally important issue at that, which was a serious lapse on its part. The Commission should have investigated why

General Yahya behaved so irresponsibly and what was the reason that he let 13-days pass before ordering implementation of Directive 7/71.

The American Papers

20. The book reproduces (p.719), a telegram sent by American Ambassador in Islamabad to US Secretary of State in Washington reporting his conversation with President Yahya Khan:

“I met with President Yahya Khan at his office in Rawalpindi at 1215 hours on Tuesday, Nov 23. The conversation which ensued was short…The President, visibly tense and obviously concerned, told me that Indian army had instituted an offensive war against Pakistan. He reiterated the information conveyed to me by Additional Foreign Secretary Alvie and added …In Chittagong sector Indian drive had transversed more than 20 miles of Pakistan territory….”

“He (Yahya Khan) concluded by stating that the deteriorating situation necessitated the establishment of a national emergency which he was doing today. He added that, while current events made today one of the most critical in Pakistan’s National History, he nonetheless was hopeful that international mediation would somehow prevent a confrontation in the Subcontinent which could be an international disaster.

“I asked Yahya if he was contemplating taking the issue to the Security Council. He replied that this had been the subject of a discussion with the Foreign Office and represented one of Pakistan’s few remaining options: however, this action, if taken, would not be instituted for several days.”

One cannot help but comment that Yahya Khan’s replies/remarks were silly; was it deliberate or a failure of his mental faculties! Strangely, the book has no cable from the Ambassador about Pakistan’s Dec 3 action.

White House Years

21. Kissinger writes: “On November 22, the first stage of full-scale war broke out on the subcontinent, though nearly a week passed before India admitted it and before all of our agencies were prepared to face its implications (p.885).

“On November 22, I reported to Nixon: the Pakistanis today claim in radio broadcasts that India, ‘without a declaration of war, has launched an all-out offensive against East Pakistan.’…The Indians claim these reports are ‘absolutely false.’ ….I had no doubt that we were now witnessing the beginning of an India-Pakistan war and that India had started it.

“Once more events in the subcontinent overtook us (p.896). Yahya had at last been cornered by his subtly implacable opponent in New Delhi. Throughout the crisis long periods of paralyzing inactivity by Yahya had been succeeded by sudden spasms as he sought to adjust to his predicament–usually too late.

“For eleven days he had stood by while Indian forces pressed deeper and deeper into East Pakistan, in effect dismembering his country…On December 3 he launched his army into an attack in the West…The reaction in our government was to use the Pakistani attack as a perfect excuse to defer the statement attacking Indian transgressions..”

Conclusion

22. A most important point needs to be addressed, first. Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan’s behavior in ridiculing Ambassador Sajjad Haider’s information about India’s plans of war against Pakistan was not only unintelligent and highly unprofessional but also deceitful. The letter was genuine. The information was true and most valuable. It was a remarkable intelligence scoop. Indian author Major Praval confirms it in his book (p.432):

“The refugee flood showed no sign of abatement and the Indian public was

clamoring for armed intervention. It was in this situation that the Indian Cabinet met

on April 28, 1971 (under the Chairmanship of Indira Gandhi). General Manekshaw

was told to attend the meeting as he was Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Without much ado he was told to take charge of the situation. When he asked what

was actually required, he was told: ‘Go into East Pakistan.’ ‘He pointed out that this

would mean War’. ‘We don’t mind it,’ was the reply.”

Praval says, “The account of the Cabinet meeting was based on his interview with

Field Marshal Manekshaw in January 1979.”

Foreign Office had Manekshaw’s letter. Its contents would be known to General Yahya, General Hamid and the senior officers in the office of the Chief Martial Law Administrator and in GHQ. How did they react to this vital information; was their reaction similar to Gul Hassan’s? It needs to be fully exposed. Z.A. Bhutto must have also known about it, as he was unofficially directing the Foreign Office, even before General Yahya appointed him as Vice Prime Minister on 7 Dec 1971.

23. The passages quoted above invite many questions and comments. We have to confine our conclusion to the issue at the topic. It is needless to repeat all the quotes that directly or indirectly point to one conclusion: that General Yahya deliberately delayed the Counter-Offensive—to let Indian Forces capture East Pakistan. It was by design, and preplanned. Quotes from Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report confirm it: “The threat to Dacca materialized from 3rd and 4th December 1971.… The decision to open the second front was actually taken on 29th but even then it was a tentative decision, for the actual D-Day had yet to be fixed…The final decision that it would be 3rd December was not known until 30th November 1971.” Yahya knew the plan,

and what he had to do. It is a shocking conclusion—extremely painful to every Pakistani; it is a severe blow to his spirit of patriotism and honour.

24. Note, CGS Gul Hassan tells Niazi’s chief of staff to rush back to Dacca as Indian invasion was expected on 20 Nov, and himself goes off to Lahore on 20 Nov for recreation! In the same shameless vein COS Hamid tells Gul Hassan to send a warning to Eastern Command to be on its toes because information had been received that the Indians were likely to attack East Pakistan on 20 Nov, and permits Gul to go to Lahore, and on 22 Nov he and Yahya go off to Sialkot for a partridge shoot!

25. Yahya Khan was not acting alone. His close advisers and holders of certain top posts, including Gen. Abdul Hamid Khan, Lt. Gen. S.G.M Peerzada, Lt.Gen. Gul Hassan Khan, Maj.Gen. Ghulam Umar and Air Marshal Rahim Khan played their part in this treacherous plan. Z.A. Bhutto, who, with Sheikh Mujib, was the local architect of the political crisis designed to lead to military surrender and secession of East Pakistan, fully backed Yahya in delaying the Counter-Offensive as well as bringing the issue of Indian aggression before the Security Council.

26. All these local actors were just puppets, working to bifurcate the United Pakistan according to a scheme made and pursued jointly by the US, India and Israel. It is not a conspiracy theory. Note this news: The Nation, 12 Feb 2010, quoting authentic sources, reported that, “A leaked document of RAW had revealed that a special Intelligence Team had been tasked to conduct extensive destabilizing operations in Pakistan…The document spells out the Mossad/RAW/CIA plot against Pakistan.”

27. This Troika of three enemy powers began its destabilizing operations in Pakistan much before the 1971 Crisis, and is continuing to do so. Its success and freedom to operate is mainly due to the fact that influential persons holding positions of power in our Country are nurtured to serve the Troika’s schemes. This Troika is behind the ongoing Terrorism and Turmoil in Pakistan. We have to confront this Troika and its local agents to save our Country from further devastation.

I do not ever complain against strangers;

whatever (harm) was done to me

was done by persons known to me. The writer is a retired Pakistan Navy

officer, and author of The Global Game for a

New World Order and Masterminds of Air Massacres

Books of Reference —Quotes and Notes

–Maj.Gen. (Retd) Shaukat Riza. The Pakistan Army–1966 -1971, Lahore,

Wajidalis (Pvt) Limited, 1990.

–Brian Cloughley. A History of the Pakistan Army–Wars and Insurrections,

Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2000.

— Muhammad Ayub. An Army–Its Role and Rule, Lahore, Al-Tahir Printers, 2003.

–Maj. Gen. (Retd) Rao Farman Ali Khan. How Pakistan Got Divided, Lahore, Jang Publishers, 1992.

–Siddiq Salik. Witness to Surrender, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1978.

–Story of the Pakistan Navy–1947-1972, Karachi, Elite Publishers Ltd, 1991.

–Admiral Iftikhar Ahmed Sirohey (Retd). Truth Never Retires, Lahore, Jang Publishers, 1995.

–Admiral Muhammad Shariff (Retd). Admiral’s Diary–Battling through Stormy Sea life for Decades, Islamabad, The Army Press, 2014.

–The Story of the Pakistan Air Force. Islamabad, Shaheen Foundation, 1988.

–Maj. Gen. Hakeem Arshad Qureshi. The 1971 Indo-Pak War–A Soldier’s Narrative, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2002.

–Lt. Gen A. A. K. Niazi. The Betrayal of East Pakistan, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1998.

–Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1993.

–Major General A. O. Mitha. Unlikely Beginnings–A Soldier’s Life,

Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2003.

–The Report of the Hamoodur Rehman Commission of Inquiry into the 1971 War (as Declassified by the Government of Pakistan), Lahore, Vanguard Books, 2001.

–The American Papers: Secret and Confidential, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh Documents 1965–1973, Compiled and Selected by Roedad Khan, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1999.

–Henry Kissinger. White House Years, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1979.

–Major K C Praval. Indian Army After Independence, New Delhi,

Lancer International, 1987.

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